Abstract-For the practical application of code cryptosystems such as McEliece, the code used in the cryptosystem should have a fast decoding algorithm. On the other hand, the code used must ensure that finding a secret key from a known public key is impractical with a relatively small key size. In this connection, in the present paper it is proposed to use tensor product of group MLD codes and in a McEliece-type cryptosystem. The algebraic structure of code in a general case differs from the structure of codes and , so it is possible to build stable cryptosystems of the McEliece type even on the basis of codes for which successful attacks on the key are known. However, in this way there is a problem of decoding code . The main result of this paper is the construction and validation of a series of fast algorithms needed for decoding this code. The process of constructing the decoder relies heavily on the group properties of code . As an application, the McEliece-type cryptosystem is constructed on code and an estimate is given of its resistance to attack on the key under the assumption that for code cryptosystems on codes an effective attack on the key is possible. The results obtained are numerically illustrated in the case when and are Reed-Muller-Berman codes for which the corresponding code cryptosystem was hacked by L. Minder and A. Shokrollahi (2007) .
INTRODUCTION
The stability of currently used asymmetric cryptosystems is based on the difficulty of the problems of factorization of integers or discrete logarithmation in a finite group. However, the authors of [1] show that these problems would take polynomial time to solve on a quantum computer. The cryptographic systems based on the use of error-correcting codes (hereinafter code cryptosystems) are currently considered as one of the alternatives to currently used asymmetric cryptographic systems [2] . A disadvantage of the code cryptosystem is the large size of the key. In particular, the size of the key for the first code cryptosystem on the basis of Goppa codes suggested by Robert J. McEliece in [3] comprises around 65 kilobytes. Attempts to decrease the size of the key by using codes other than Goppa codes did not provide the desired result, since the suggested systems turned out to be unstable. Unstable systems include popular systems such as Niederreiter cryptosystem [4] , Gabidulin-Paramonov-Tret'yakov cryptosystem [5] , and Sidel'nikov cryptosystem [6] . For the above-mentioned cryptosystems, successful structural attacks are known, i.e., the attacks aimed at finding an appropriate secret key by a known public key [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
It is assumed that the resistance of code cryptosystems to structural attacks can be enhanced by using error-correcting codes, which, on the one hand, have a fast decoding algorithm, and on the other hand, possess an explicit algebraic structure. Such an approach is applied in [12] , where for a McEliece-type cryptosystem it is suggested to use codes induced by group codes. The present paper offers one generalization of this approach: as an error-correcting code, it is suggested to use tensor product of two group majority-logic decodable codes and (MLD-codes). However, this gives rise to the problem of decoding code , the solution for which is unknown in a general case, even when effective decoders for code and are known.
The goal of this study is to construct and validate a series of fast algorithms necessary for decoding code , where and are group MLD codes on groups and , correspondingly. It should be noted
that in this case, code is a group code on direct product . The process of constructing the decoder relies significantly on the group properties of code and the results of [13] , where the algorithms of decoding for individual group codes are built. As an application, a McEliece-type cryptosystem on code is built, and its resistance to an attack on the key is theoretically assessed assuming the possibility of a successful attack on the key for code cryptosystems on codes . In this paper, the results of resistance are illustrated numerically in cases when , a Reed-Muller-Berman code, defined on an additive group of field , , for which the McEliece-type cryptosystem was hacked by L. Minder and A. Shokrollahi (2007) .
The results of the study are represented in the first and second sections. The first section lists the required details on the group MLD codes, and structural algorithms for decoding the tensor product of such codes are further built and validated. The second section provides the analysis of resistance of the McEliece-type cryptosystem on code to finding a matching secret key if a similar structural attack is known for at least one of the codes, or .
TENSOR PRODUCT OF MLD CODES

Codes
For a natural , we will use symbol as a designation for set . Let us assume that is a vector space above finite field . Let us fix in basis , and using symbol we will designate metric space with Hamming distance , defined relatively to basis . For vector , the set of basis vectors, the coefficients of which in decomposition are not zero, is called a support of vector relative to basis and designated as ; coefficients will be named the -coordinate value of vector . Weight of vector is determined as . (Hereinafter, symbol designates the power of set .) Any linear subspace of metric space is called a linear code. The dimension and length of the code will be designated as and , correspondingly, and the minimal code distance of code will be designated as . The dual code for code will be denoted as . Set of vectors is called -orthogonal to vector if for all and
Assume that is a code vector, is a vector accepted from a channel, . Let us consider decomposition of the error vector, , by basis . If for the -coordinate there is decoding tree providing for , then the value of for the -coordinate of vector can be explicitly found using a majority-logic decoder (see [13] , algorithm 3, Decoder2). According to [13] , decoding tree for the -coordinate will be hereinafter referred to as a marked tree with root , possessing the following properties:
(1) The set of vertices of this tree comprises of the level; the root with mark is situated at level 0, and leaves are located at level ; the marks of vertices of the th level form a series of , .
(2) The tree's leaves are marked with elements from .
(3) Each vertex not representing a leaf has at least of immediately following vertices.
(4) Mark of each tree's vertex is connected to numeric values of the mark computed depending on the value of the vector accepted from a channel, : for each leaf of the tree, the value of equals a scalar product of of vectors and , and for the vertices at level the value of is computed in accordance with the algorithm built in [13] thrmMajorVote (for completeness, algorithm MajorVote is given below); The construction of series is represented by a complex problem in a general case. On the one hand, the problem of constructing a tree for a fixed coordinate is complex; on the other hand, trees for different coordinates are constructed independently. At the same time, solving the second problem is simple for group codes if there is a decoding tree for at least one coordinate. The necessary details about the group codes and constructing set for group code are given below.
Group Codes
Assume that is a finite group with a fixed linear order at a set of its elements, and is a neutral element of the group; the fixed order on the group will be designated as . Let us consider group algebra , the elements of which are formal sums (functions):
In finite-dimensional group algebra let us fix basis , where is the Dirac function;
. This allows considering Hamming dimension for . It should be noted that in the category of finite-dimensional linear spaces, and are isomorphic; the corresponding isomorphism will be designated as . It should also be noted that the product of functions and in equals . Thus, the elements of the group algebra can be written as follows:
. For convenience, the value of function at point will be denoted as .
According to [14] , any left ideal other than in group algebra is called a "group code" ( codes) of length . The ideal in group algebra is a subspace of the space of functions and dimension of code is the dimension of this subspace. Assume that is the basis of ideal . It should be noted that order induces the order on basis of group algebra , which allows drawing generating matrix of group code : 
Group acts on the left on group algebra in the following natural way (see 14, p. 32):
Note that is also a group code [14] , i.e., the left ideal. Owing to this, according to rule (5), the action of group on elements of code does not go beyond . On the other hand, group acts transitively on elements from and does not violate the -orthogonality [13] . This allows building series (2) by one of the decoding trees (the respective algorithms are built in [13] ). In particular, if for basis function it was possible to build decoding tree , then tree for basis function , can be constructed by action of elements upon the nodes of tree following rule (5). As such, and for all . Then, is generating matrix , where, according to (4), the generating matrices of codes and can be represented as follows:
Tensor Product of Group Codes
Note that , , and
where is the basis of group algebra on group with a linear order induced by linear orders of and .
Decoding the Tensor Product of Codes
Assume that is a code vector, which looks as follows at the exit from the channel: 
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In this section, we build algorithms, which allow finding the correct value of error vector , if the weight of this vector meets the following inequality (see (6) ):
Firstly, let us formulate a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1.
Assume that , is a -orthogonal set for vector , , is a -orthogonal set for vector ; then, the -orthogonal set for vector comprises the following vectors:
where , .
Proof. This lemma is derived from [14] .
For vectors and , let us consider the corresponding -orthogonal sets: and . Below is algorithm M_orth, which for each vector constructs -orthogonal set , providing:
Using algorithm M_orth, we built the MakeTensorTree algorithm, which constructs a supplementary decoding tree for the root with mark by decoding trees and as follows: (10) Let us explain why the tree constructed in the MakeTensorTree algorithm has levels. In this algorithm, using algorithm M_orth for each vertex at level of tree (10), where is the th level of the decoding tree for code and is the th level of the decoding tree for code , a set is built at level of tree (10), consisting of subsets of two types:
Source parameters: Vectors and and the corresponding -orthogonal sets: and .
Result: -orthogonal set for vector . , ,
⊗ . Thus, the maximum level of tree (10) will be achieved, for example if we first pass vectors of the second type, each of which resides at the next level of the tree, and then pass vectors of the first type. Then, the depth of tree (10) will be equal to .
If and are group MLD codes, i.e., and , then in a general case the supplementary decoding tree constructed using MakeTensorTree, does not allow finding the values of errors , the weight of which does not meet inequality (8) , using the majority-logic decoder (see [13] , algorithm 3, Decoder2). The fact is that, based on the comparison of equalities (6) and (9) , power of -orthogonal set constructed using MakeTensorTree is smaller.
for each node with mark .
Supplementary decoding tree (10) can be converted to the full decoding tree of MLD code on the basis of structure (3) of Lemma 1 by adding the missing vertices; however, it is convenient to only work with the values of the missing vertices. Algorithm AddVals for each node by the vector x received from the channel, and supplementary decoding tree (10) calculates the additional of values of the marks of the missing vertices; however, it should be emphasized that tree (10) is not appended with additional vertices when fulfilling AddVals.
Algorithm AddVals is applied in decoding algorithm DecodeTensorBit, which uses accepted vector to find the value of for error vector in the coordinate corresponding to basis function . (It should be noted that in DecodeTensorBit an operation of concatenation of series of numbers is used, which is designated as . Thus, in case of the tensor product of codes, algorithm DecodeTensorBit fulfills the function of the above algorithm of majority-logic decoding and finds the correct coordinates of error vector , when the weight of error meets inequality (8) .
Note that algorithm MakeTensorTree builds a supplementary decoding tree for the coordinate corresponding to element . The authors of [13] built the below supplementary algorithm, 
M_orth , , , .
⊗ . CloneTree, for groups codes, which allows constructing a supplementary decoding tree for the root with any mark based on the supplementary decoding tree with one mark at the root.
Thus, the series of supplementary decoding trees
Source parameters: x is the vector of type (7), is the orthogonal set for , is the decoding tree, k is the current level of the tree for group code can be constructed by tree (10).
Result
In particular, for any basis function :
Similar to algorithm Decoder3 from [13] , we built the DecodeTensorVector algorithm of decoding accepted vector , in which each coordinate is decoded using the DecodeTensorBit algorithm.
Thus, the following theorem is valid. 
where . The rule of encoding random message looks as follows: (11) where the Hamming weight of added error meet the inequality: . In order to decode , secret key is used under the rule: , where is a decoder for code , reliably correcting and fewer errors, and restoring vector . Further it is suggested that vector of errors is chosen on a random and equiprobable basis from set , comprising weight vectors , .
Analysis of Resistance of to Attacks on the Key
Let us study a cryptosystem of McEliece type, , where is a tensor product of code and code . As a violator model, let us consider an intruder whose target is to find a matching secret key for correct decoding of cryptograms. It is assumed that the observer has algorithm Attack with the help of which the matching secret key for cryptosystem can be successfully found.
The generating matrix of code looks like , and dimension of code equals . Then, -matrix (the part of secret key ) can be represented in a stacked form: (12) where is the -matrix, . Thus, the following representation is valid for matrix : (13) For each , the stacked column of matrix (13) can be represented as follows:
It is directly checked whether matrix has rank for each . Then, the complexity of finding a matching secret key does not exceed the corresponding difficulty of using algorithm AttackInduced from DEUNDYAK et al. [12] for the McEliece-type cryptosystem on an induced code with generating matrix . In particular, if is the computational difficulty of algorithm Attack for , then (15) is the upper-level assessment of the difficulty of finding the key for . Table 1 shows an example of calculating the difficulty of an attack on the key for cryptosystem , where is the Reed-Muller code, . Each table cell contains number  , where is the number of probed keys during the attack (multiplier in (15) ), where and are the lengths of codes and , correspondingly. Table cells  with bold text correspond to , since probing the keys with the length of 128 bit and more is currently a computationally impossible problem [16] . It should also be noted that , where and are permutation matrices of appropriate size. Thus, pairs and in the table correspond to the cells with the same value of . Based on the results given in Table 1 , it can be concluded that for Reed-Muller codes, and , cryptosystem is resistant to structural attacks on the key already at , where is the length of code , .
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